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Background
The Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes is a tool developed by the United Nations Office
on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect to guide the assessment of the risk of
atrocity crimes1 worldwide. This document builds upon the previous Framework of Analysis for
the risk of genocide that was developed in 2009 by the then United Nations Office of the Special
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, in order to fulfil its early warning mandate. That tool was
based on the foundation laid by former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan when he
launched his plan of action to prevent genocide in April 2004. In the Secretary-General’s words on
that occasion:
If we are serious about preventing or stopping genocide in the future, we must not be held back
by legalistic arguments about whether a particular atrocity meets the definition of genocide or
not. By the time we are certain, it may often be too late to act. We must recognize the signs of
approaching or possible genocide, so that we can act in time to avert it. We badly need clear
guidelines on how to identify such extreme cases and how to react to them. Such guidelines
would ensure that we have no excuse to ignore a real danger of genocide when it does arise.

The initial framework of analysis for the prevention of genocide became obsolete when, in
2010, the Secretary-General decided to link the complementary mandates of the Special Advisers
on the Prevention of Genocide and on the Responsibility to Protect through a joint office. Since
then, the early warning work undertaken by this office has covered the risk not only of genocide
but also of war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
The present Framework thus provides an integrated analysis and risk assessment tool for
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The revision also reflects
recent developments and new research into the processes that lead to these crimes. It was subject to
consultations within and outside the United Nations system for a period of almost two years. The
result is a Framework that serves as a working tool for the assessment of the risk of atrocity crimes
in all parts of the world and for identifying those countries most at risk. It can be used to develop a
basic risk assessment, as well an assessment of how a situation is changing over time and the kinds
of events that can trigger change, or prevent a situation from deteriorating.
The Framework is based on the premise that, to be effective, assessments require the systematic
collection of accurate and reliable information based on a number of risk factors and indicators. The
broad risk factors and the more specific indicators reflect definitions of the crimes in international
law, case law from the work of international courts or tribunals, and empirical analysis of past and
present situations.
The elements required to assess the risk of genocide and crimes against humanity are
directly influenced by the legal definition of these crimes. With respect to war crimes and ethnic
cleansing, however, the approach is slightly different. First, given the absence of a conceptual
definition common to all war crimes, such as that which exists in the case of genocide and crimes
against humanity, the Framework focuses on those war crimes that have the greatest impact on
the protection of human life. In addition, given the focus of the Responsibility to Protect on the
protection of populations from the most serious violations of international human rights and
humanitarian law, the Framework covers war crimes that assume a more systematic or widespread
pattern of conduct. Second, given that ethnic cleansing does not have a distinct legal definition as
The Office uses the term atrocity crimes to refer to the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, as
well as to ethnic cleansing even though the latter does not constitute an independent crime under international law.
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an international crime, but includes acts that can constitute other atrocity crimes or elements of
them, it has been integrated into the analysis of the risk factors for those crimes.
This Framework is a public document. The Office encourages and welcomes its use by
international, regional and national actors as a tool either for early warning mechanisms, or
for other mechanisms used for monitoring, assessment and forecasting. In addition, the Office
recommends that Member States use the Framework to help identify both areas of success as well
as gaps in atrocity prevention capacities and strategies at the national level. In the foreword of the
document, the United Nations Secretary-General urges Member States, United Nations colleagues,
civil society actors, media, and all persons dedicated to prevention and protection efforts, to
disseminate and make use of this tool. In the end, sounding the alarm, mobilising preventive action
and promoting resilient societies constitute tasks for all of us.
Common and Specific Risk Factors
This Framework defines risk factors as the conditions that increase the risk of or susceptibility to
negative outcomes. They include behaviours, circumstances or elements that create an environment
conducive to the commission of atrocity crimes, or indicate the potential, probability or risk of
their occurrence. This requires assessment of a range of factors related not only to the risk of armed
conflict but also to other types of situations that put a State under stress and create an environment
conducive for atrocity crimes to occur. This means, for example, looking at the capacities and
motivations of potential perpetrators; monitoring the human rights situation; assessing strengths
and weaknesses of key state institutions; identifying gaps in societal resilience, or sources of
mitigation; and anticipating a variety of possible triggers.
Risk factors are not all the same. Some are structural in nature, such as the weakness of State
institutions, while others pertain to more dynamic circumstances or events, such as triggering
factors. Triggers and other dynamic elements transform general risk into an increased likelihood
that atrocities crimes will be committed. The indicators included in this framework are different
manifestations of each risk factor, and therefore assist in determining the degree to which an
individual risk factor is present. The particular indicators identified in the Framework have been
drawn from past and current cases, but are not intended to be exhaustive.
In summary, the Framework contains two main analytical tools for assessing the risk of
atrocity crimes: (a) a list of fourteen risk factors for atrocity crimes; and (b) indicators for each of
the risk factors.
Among the fourteen risk factors outlined, the first eight are common to all crimes, reflecting
the fact that atrocity crimes tend to occur in similar settings and share several elements or features.
They are: (1) situations of armed conflict or other forms of instability; (2) record of serious violations
of international human rights and humanitarian law; (3) weakness of State structures; (4) motives
and Incentives; (5) capacity to commit atrocity crimes; (6) absence of mitigating factors; (7) enabling
circumstances or preparatory action; (8) triggering factors.
In addition to these common factors, the Framework identifies six additional risk factors, two
specific to each of the international crimes – namely genocide, crimes against humanity and war
crimes. The risk factors specific to the crime of genocide are: (9) intergroup tensions or patterns of
discrimination against protected groups; and (10) signs of intent to destroy in whole or in part a
protected group. The risk factors specific to crimes against humanity are: (11) signs of a widespread
or systematic attack against any civilian population; and (12) signs of a plan or policy to attack any
civilian population. The risk factors specific to war crimes are: (13) serious threats to those protected
under international humanitarian law; and (14) serious threats to humanitarian or peacekeeping
operations. The chart on the next page provides a summary of risk factors and indicators.
The common risk factors are aimed at supporting the identification of the probability of
atrocity crimes overall, without necessarily identifying the type of crime. The assumption is that in
the initial stages of monitoring, it is not always possible to identify which specific crime is most at
risk. This becomes clearer as the process leading to atrocity crimes progresses. For example, weak
State structures put populations or groups at risk of any of these crimes. In addition, different
kinds of atrocity crimes can occur concurrently in the same situation, or one crime might be a
precursor to another form of atrocity crime.
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COMMON RISK FACTORS
Risk Factor 1 Situations of armed conflict or other forms of instability
Risk Factor 2 Record of serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law
Risk Factor 3 Weakness of State structures
Risk Factor 4 Motives or incentives
Risk Factor 5 Capacity to commit atrocity crimes
Risk Factor 6 Absence of mitigating factors
Risk Factor 7 Enabling circumstances or preparatory action
Risk Factor 8 Triggering factors
SPECIFIC RISK FACTORS
Genocide
Risk Factor 9 Intergroup tensions or patterns of discrimination against protected groups
Risk Factor 10 Signs of an intent to destroy in whole or in part a protected group
Crimes Against Humanity
Risk Factor 11 Signs of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population
Risk Factor 12 Signs of a plan or policy to attack any civilian population
War crimes
Risk Factor 13 Serious threats to those protected under international humanitarian law
Risk Factor 14 Serious threats to humanitarian or peacekeeping operations

The specific risk factors, on the other hand, result from the fact that each crime has elements
and precursors that are not common to all three crimes. This is clear in the elements that are specific
to the crime of genocide, particularly the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group. The evidence of such intent points to a higher risk of genocide. In this
way, the specific risk factors identified in the framework reflect the legal definitions of the crimes,
even though they are not strictly limited by them, nor intend to be criminal evidence of them.
The risk factors are elaborated as follows:
1.

Situations of armed conflict or other forms of instability
Atrocity crimes often take place against a background of either an international or noninternational armed conflict. Armed conflicts are periods characterized by a high incidence
of violence, insecurity and the permissibility of acts that would otherwise not be acceptable.
In addition, the capacity of States to inflict harm is usually at its peak during periods of
conflict. If armed conflict is a violent way of dealing with problems, it is clear that the risk
of atrocity crimes acutely increases during these periods. However, other situations that
do not constitute formal armed conflicts can also put a State under such a level of stress
that it becomes more prone to serious human rights violations and, eventually, to atrocity
crimes. In fact, genocide and crimes against humanity can also occur during times of
peace. This is most likely when there are serious levels of political instability, threats to the
security of the country or even volatility in economic or social affairs. Although situations
of instability, or even of armed conflict, will not necessarily lead to the occurrence of
atrocity crimes, they highly increase the likelihood of those crimes.
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2.

Record of serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law
Societies that have already experienced serious violations of international human rights
and humanitarian law or atrocity crimes, or where these are currently taking place, can
be more prone to further atrocity crimes. As history has demonstrated, atrocity crimes in
general and genocide in particular are preceded by less widespread or systematic serious
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. These are typically
violations of civil and political rights, but they may include also severe restrictions
to economic, social and cultural rights, often linked to patterns of discrimination or
exclusion of protected groups, populations or individuals. This risk factor is also relevant
where the legacies of past atrocity crimes have not been adequately addressed through
individual criminal accountability, reparation, truth-seeking and reconciliation processes,
as well as comprehensive reform measures in the security and judicial sectors. A
society in this situation is more likely to resort again to violence as a form of addressing
problems.

3.

Weakness of State structures
The risk of atrocity crimes can be increased by a State’s lack of capacity to prevent these
crimes. A State protects its population through the establishment of frameworks and
institutions that are guided by the rule of law and good governance principles. However,
when such structures are inadequate or simply do not exist, the ability of the State to
prevent atrocity crimes is significantly diminished. As a consequence, populations are
left vulnerable to those who may take advantage of the limitations or the dysfunction
of State machinery, or to those that may opt for violence to respond to real or perceived
threats. This is even more the case in a situation of armed conflict, when it is paramount
that those resorting to the use of force are fully aware of and respect the rules that aim to
protect populations from such force, and have the necessary means to do so. The weakness
of State structures will not necessarily be a cause of atrocity crimes, but it undoubtedly
decreases the level of protection and, when analysed in conjunction with other risk factors,
increases the probability of atrocity crimes.

4.

Motives or incentives
The motives or incentives that lead perpetrators to commit atrocity crimes are not
elements of the legal definition of those crimes and are therefore not relevant to determine
individual criminal responsibility. However, from an early warning perspective, it is
extremely important to identify motivations, aims or drivers that could influence certain
individuals or groups to resort to massive violence as a way to achieve goals, feed an
ideology or respond to real or perceived threats. Doing so not only allows for a higher
degree of prediction of the likelihood of those crimes, but also opens up the opportunity
to develop prevention strategies aimed at neutralizing or curbing those motives or
incentives. No one specific motive or incentive will automatically lead to atrocity crimes,
but certain motives or incentives are more likely to do so, especially those that are based
on exclusionary ideology or the the construction of binary identities of “us” and “them”..
The historical, political, economic or even cultural environment in which such ideologies
develop can also be relevant.

5.

Capacity to commit atrocity crimes
The systematic and large-scale violence that marks atrocity crimes requires a substantial
level of planning that, in most cases, is sustained over a period of time. To be able to
engage in such conduct, actors aiming at committing atrocity crimes must have at their
substantial resources and support, either internal or external. However, the fact that States
or groups have the capacity to perpetrate atrocity crimes does not imply that they will
commit them – for that, it is also necessary that they have the intention to make use of that
capacity against a protected group, population or individual. . In contrast, those who do
not have the capacity to commit atrocity crimes, i.e., where one or more of the indicators
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mentioned above are not present, will most likely not be able to put any plan into action,
or will face serious challenges in its attempt to implement it.
6.

Absence of mitigating factors
Atrocity crimes result from a convergence of elements, as demonstrated in this framework.
Among those elements, some point more directly to the likelihood of atrocity crimes, while
others might have a more indirect effect and seem secondary, or even too broad to merit
consideration. However, even if indirect, these elements can contribute to preventing an
escalation of violence or even to ending it and can therefore reduce the probability of
atrocity crimes. Presence of strong and representative civil society organizations; operation
of free, diverse and independent media; and access to the country by international or
regional actors, constitute examples of factors that can mitigate the risk of commission
of atrocity crimes. While some of these elements can exist prior to the development of
tensions, crises or conflict, their impact may weaken as a situation escalates. It is therefore
important to strengthen mitigating factors as a way of increasing resilience against the
risk of atrocity crimes. A determination of the strength of mitigating factors in each given
situation is also essential for early warning purposes.

7.

Enabling circumstances or preparatory action
Atrocity crimes, and in particular genocide and crimes against humanity, are processes
that take time to plan, coordinate and implement. The creation of militias, imposition of
emergency laws or acquisition of large quantities of ammunition, which we consider as
indicators in this risk factor, constitute steps that could point to preparatory action. Atrocity
crimes, therefore, cannot be explained as isolated or spontaneous events that perpetrators
decided to commit without some level of preparation. As mentioned in connection to risk
factor n.5 (capacity to commit atrocity crimes), perpetrators also need to possess sufficient
resources to be able to commit massive or widespread acts of violence. . It is possible
to identify events, actions or changes that point to the likelihood that certain actors are
taking steps towards a scenario of mass violence and possibly atrocity crimes. Such events,
actions or changes can also serve to create an environment that favours or even encourages
the commission of such crimes. Recognizing such indicators and establishing a causal link
to the probability of atrocity crimes is not always easy, but it is of great relevance. As with
all risk factors, analysis of this risk factor should take into consideration a context in which
other risk factors might also be present.

8.

Triggering factors
The dynamics of atrocity crimes are not the same in all cases. In fact, they can vary
considerably. The commission of atrocity crimes may progress at a faster pace if the
perpetrators have a clear plan and the immediate capacity to implement it. In other
situations, the commission of atrocity crimes might unfold at a late stage of a situation
of on ongoing crisis. It may also be that unpredictable events or circumstances aggravate
conditions or spark a sudden deterioration in a situation, prompting the perpetration of
atrocity crimes. This is particularly the case for on-going armed conflicts. An adequate
early warning assessment should thus be mindful of all such events or circumstances
and consider their potential impact, even if they appear to be unrelated to more direct or
structural risk factors.

Risk factors that are specific for each of the crimes are as follows:
9.

Intergroup tensions or patterns of discrimination against protected groups (genocide)
Genocide is an extreme form of identity-based crime. Whether real or socially constructed,
identity can be subject to manipulation by elites, including as a deliberate tactic for
personal or political gain, and may be used to deepen societal divisions. Identity-based
conflict, which may give rise to the crime as defined by the Convention on the Prevention
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and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, can be rooted in differences between
national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, whether real or perceived. It can also be
rooted in other differences, such as those of a political or even geographical nature, that
eventually develop along national, ethnical, racial or religious lines. However, the risk
factor is not the existence of diversity within the population of a country, nor is it those
differences per se that cause conflict between groups. Instead, it is discrimination based on
such differences, and persistent patterns of it, that establish divisions within society which
serve as both a material cause and a perceived justification of group violence. Without
group-level discrimination, even deeply seated grievances are unlikely to transform into
the patterns of abuse that give rise to genocide.
10. Signs of an intent to destroy in whole or in part a protected group (genocide)
The intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group
is both one of the most fundamental and one of the most difficult elements of the crime
of genocide to prove. It is also a challenging element to predict from an early warning
perspective. Frequently, the intent only comes to light after a crime has taken place,
typically during accountability processes, or sometimes when it might be too late to take
preventive action due to the advanced level of the violence. However, there are some early
indicators that can serve as a warning sign. Those indicators are unlikely to be explicit, but
they can also be inferred from conduct that would reasonably lead to the belief, even if not
the certainty, that the intent of or a plan for annihilation could exist. Indicators can include
overt methods of destruction, or otherwise covert or indirect methods that in practice lead
to the same ultimate result. In addition, case law has associated intent with the existence of
a State or organizational plan or policy, even if the definition of genocide in international
law does not include that element. As genocide is not a spontaneous act, it is unlikely that
it will be committed in the absence of such a plan or policy.
11. Signs of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population (crimes against
humanity)
Crimes against humanity involve either large-scale violence (quantitative element) or a
methodical type of violence (qualitative element). This excludes random, accidental or
isolated acts of violence that, in addition, could be difficult to predict. Instead, the type
of violence that characterizes crimes against humanity will most probably require a level
of preparation that can be revealed through different indicators. Such indicators can, for
example, relate to the means and methods used to engage in violence, or to patterns of
violent conduct during the early stages of a conflict that can help predict an aggravation
of those patterns and, consequently, the potential for crimes against humanity. Other
indicators can point to patterns of conduct – even outside of a conflict situation – that
manifest earlier, such as the building up of capacity for large-scale or systematic violence,
or the use of alternative means to target civilian populations or particular groups within
them. Identifying early stages of pattern manifestation is crucial to be able to devise
strategies to stop them.
12. Signs of a plan or policy to attack any civilian population (crimes against humanity)
In addition to the requirement that attacks against the civilian population be widespread
or systematic, crimes against humanity are committed in furtherance of a State or
organizational policy. Even though this is not included in the definition of the crime
under Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute, Article 7(2)(a) of the same document introduces
this element. The plan or policy does not need to be explicitly stipulated or formally
adopted and can, therefore, be inferred from the totality of the circumstances. Early
signs of those circumstances, such as the indicators mentioned above, reveal planning,
promotion or encouragement of violent acts, even if not explicitly presented as such.
Conduct that manifests as widespread or systematic, as described in the previous risk
factor, can be an indication of a plan or policy. On the other hand, a plan or policy can
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point to the systematic nature of an attack. The distinction between both might not
always be clear.
13. Serious threats to those protected under international humanitarian law (war crimes)
In contrast to the crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity, war crimes always
take place in the context of an armed conflict. Consequently, indicators specific to war
crimes surface at a late stage, when options for prevention are more limited. For earlier
preventive action, common risk factors should be considered first. However, even if a
conflict is already under way, there are still measures that can be taken to diminish the
effects of hostilities and, therefore, to prevent war crimes. The list of war crimes is long
and each has a specific definition. They can also vary according to different norms of
international law. The indicators identified above attempt to include indicators relevant to
as many war crimes as possible that are related to the protection of human life. However,
they are far from exhaustive. Some of the indicators identified can also on their own be
war crimes, such as attacks against civilian property, which can point to an increase in the
threat to human life.
14. Serious threats to humanitarian or peacekeeping operations (war crimes)
International humanitarian law affords specific protection to those working for
humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping missions in a setting of armed conflict, as long
as they do not take direct part in hostilities, except for self-defense. These operations are
particularly exposed to the violence that accompanies periods of conflict due to the key
role they play in the protection of human lives and the alleviation of human suffering
during those periods. A set of specific indicators can help in assessing the likelihood of
attacks against this group that could constitute war crimes. As the focus of the Framework
is the protection of human life, attacks against property of humanitarian or peacekeeping
operations have been included only as indicators of an increased risk to the lives of their
staff.
Methodology of Use
Assessments of the risk of atrocity crimes must be flexible and sensitive to context. Five points are
particularly important to bear in mind when using the Framework.
First, not all risk factors need to be present for there to be an assessment that there is a significant
risk of atrocity crimes occurring. For example, there are situations where information gathered has
confirmed the presence of most of the risk factors, but atrocity crimes have not yet taken place. This
could be due to the absence of a triggering event or the presence of a strong mitigating factor. In
addition, it may not be possible to obtain sufficiently accurate and reliable information to confirm
the presence of a particular risk factor. Nevertheless, this should not deter monitors and analysts
from warning of the likelihood that an atrocity crime could be committed. Triggering factors
are not always predictable and a strong mitigating factor might weaken or disappear. It is also
important to bear in mind that common risk factors tend to be manifest sooner than specific risk
factors. Information that confirms the presence of specific risk factors is sometimes more difficult
to obtain at an early stage.
Second, the more risk factors (and the greater number of relevant indicators) there are
present, the greater the risk that an atrocity crime may be committed. Also, the greater the number
of indicators of a particular risk factor that are present, the greater the importance and role of
that factor in a particular situation. For instance, a situation that presents motives and incentives
(risk factor 4) and in which there is weakness of State structures (risk factor 3), is more prone to
commission of atrocity crimes if there is context of armed conflict or other forms of stability (risk
factor 1) and an absence of mitigating factors (risk factor 6). In this example, the absence of risk
factors 1 and 6, in principle, would lower the risk of atrocity crimes. Likewise, we can assume
that weakness of State structures (risk factor 3) is more pronounced if all indicators within that
risk factor are present than if only some are. For instance, the presence of a weak national legal
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protection framework becomes a stronger indicator if it is coupled with lack of independent and
impartial judiciary or with high levels of corruption. If the judiciary is impartial and corruption is
not rampant, the impact of a weak legal protection system – for purpose of risk of atrocity crimes
—is less pronounced.
Third, the risk factors and the indicators are not ranked, as their relative importance will
differ according to the particular context. Even though armed conflict has been identified as the
strongest or most important contributing risk factor, armed conflict is not a precondition of all
atrocity crimes – genocide and crimes against humanity can also occur in times of peace. Certainly,
some risk factors will have a greater weight than others, or will be manifest more often than others.
However, all contribute to increasing the risk of atrocity crimes.
Fourth, monitors and analysts will need to be flexible when considering and weighing all the
elements in this Framework and situate them within a broader political, contextual, historical and
cultural analysis. In addition, given the development of new trends and patterns of violence and of
conduct related to conflict, assessments should be open to new elements that might surface.
Finally, the Framework of Analysis provides a set of elements to help monitors make
qualitative and systematic assessments of the risk of atrocity crimes in specific situations. However,
the presence of risk factors for atrocity crimes in a particular situation does not automatically lead
to the occurrence of those crimes; risk is not equated with inevitability. Sometimes, even when
several risk factors are present, a situation may not escalate to the point where atrocities will be
committed. That said, and although it is impossible to draw a direct causal relation between the
presence of particular risk factors and the occurrence of atrocity crimes, these crimes are rarely
committed in the absence of all or most of the risk factors that the Framework identifies.
The Framework as a Tool for Early Action
While the Framework constitutes primarily a tool for analysis, it has also been designed to facilitate
early action. The assumption is that a systematic application of the Framework will contribute to
the identification of situations of concern and to sound the alarm earlier and more consistently.
In this regard, both States and the international community must assume their legally established
responsibilities to respond to these alarms and to protect populations against atrocity crimes
before they occur. The Framework, in short, aims at compelling actors to move from early warning
to early action
The Framework recognizes that atrocity crimes do not usually constitute single or random
events. Instead, they tend to develop in a dynamic process that offers entry points for action
to prevent their occurrence. To engage in the level of violence associated with atrocity crimes,
perpetrators need time to develop the capacity to do so, mobilize the resources, and take concrete
steps that will help them to achieve their objectives. If the risk factors and precursors of these
crimes are understood, it follows that it is also possible to identify measures that can be taken by
States and the international community to forestall the dynamics that lead to these crimes.
In sum, the earlier the risk factors are identified, the greater the opportunities for early and
preventive action. As times goes on, such action becomes more difficult and more costly. As
experience shows, if atrocity crimes are already occurring, the options available to respond will be
very limited. In some cases, they may require the use of coercive measures including, if all peaceful
means fail, the use of force.
Atrocity crimes have wide-ranging costs and long-lasting effects. Painful experience over
the past decades illustrates how the perpetration of violence based on the victims’ identity
destroys the fabric of societies, with consequences that pass from one generation to the next.
As the United Nations Secretary-General underlined in his 2015 report on the responsibility to
protect, it is imperative that Member States and other international actors devote more energy and
resources to effective prevention and accelerate efforts to put an end to the ongoing perpetration of
such crimes.
We consider that the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes constitutes a tool to facilitate
accurate assessment and identify options for adequate and effective response. We encourage it to
be used by all those who are devoted to the principle of prevention and whose contribution and
response can be essential for the prevention of atrocity crimes.
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Note
The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the United Nations.
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